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Feminist philosophy has offered mixed opinions on the collaborative projects of Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari. But although there has been much discussion of the political 
expediency of what Deleuze and Guattari do say about sexual difference, this article will 
outline what is absent from Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus (the two volumes 
comprising Capitalism and Schizophrenia). Specifically, I will argue that though Deleuze and 
Guattari offer a historical account of a range of power structures—most notably capitalism, 
but also despotism, fascism, and authoritarianism—they give no such account of the 
development of patriarchy. Secondarily, this article will argue that Deleuze and Guattari’s 
analysis of contemporary power relations could be improved by adding an accompanying 
analysis of the institution of patriarchy. After offering a detailed account of the technical 
vocabulary used by Deleuze and Guattari for the analysis of political institutions, I will argue 
that what their work requires is an account of how patriarchy is historically produced by an 
“abstract machine” of masculinity. This article will finish with some suggestions for the way 




DELEUZE AND GUATTARI ON PATRIARCHY 
 
Feminist encounters with Deleuze and Guattari’s work have tended to go in one of two 
directions. On the one hand, there have been those who have assessed the pair’s explicit 
comments on sex and gender, especially in relation to their controversial concept of the 
“becoming-woman.” These readings have brought about mixed results, from the heavily 
critical (Jardine 1985, 217), through engaged ambivalence (Braidotti 2003), to the openly 
approving (Griggers 1997). On the other hand, there have been those who have focused on 
Deleuze and Guattari’s more general attempts to overturn the founding assumptions of 
Western philosophy. These thinkers have argued that, though not explicitly engaged with the 
question of sexual difference, Deleuze and Guattari’s critiques of representational thought, 
Western rationalism, and hierarchical orders may contain hidden weapons that feminists 
could turn to their own ends. Elizabeth Grosz takes this tack when she argues that, despite the 
fact that Deleuze and Guattari “do not actively affirm or support feminist struggles,” their 
work can “help clear the ground of metaphysical concepts so that women may be able to 
devise their own knowledges and accounts of themselves and the world” (Grosz 1993, 169). 
Hannah Stark’s engagements with Deleuze typify the same position: “Deleuze’s work is 
useful for feminist theory not because it worked in a sustained way on women or gender, but 
instead because his work undermines the philosophical systems that have oppressed women 
since the Enlightenment” (Stark 2017, 1).  
Much of this work has been fruitful, pushing both feminist thinkers and Deleuzoguattarian 
scholars to rethink their respective positions.<1> Somewhat surprisingly, however, much less 
has been said about the applicability of Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy to the 
 
analysis of patriarchy as such. In Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and 
Guattari develop a detailed account of both the genesis and contemporary operations of a 
range of political institutions, including despotism, capitalism, fascism, totalitarianism, and 
authoritarianism. To take one example, Deleuze and Guattari attempt to show how fascism 
developed out of previous power structures, how it can be differentiated from totalitarianism, 
why it arose in Europe with such force in the twentieth century, how it might recur in a 
multitude of different settings, and how we might fight it when it does. In the sections that 
follow, I will aim to show that the reason Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy has not 
yet been taken up in feminist discourse is that there is a notable absence in their account of 
political power regarding the question of patriarchy. By tracing the outline of the patriarchy-
shaped-hole in Deleuze and Guattari’s work, I will show exactly what is missing in their 
account of contemporary politics and what we might do to fill such a gap.  
In contrast to the way they analyze other forms of political subjugation, Deleuze and 
Guattari’s engagements with the question of sexual difference are always situated post 
factum: they discuss the heterosexualization of desire in the Oedipal family setting, and pick 
out “becoming-woman” as a privileged mode of emancipatory politics, but they give no 
answers to the questions of why the binary logic of disciplinary societies has played out 
historically in the form of a massive asymmetry that gives privilege to masculine power. 
Simply put, they give no account of the genesis of patriarchy. 
Deleuze and Guattari only mention the concept of patriarchy in one short section of Anti-
Oedipus (Deleuze and Guattari 2012, 188 and 191) and not at all in A Thousand Plateaus 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004). This is especially odd given the fact that their two major 
reference points, namely Marx and Freud, had both given some consideration to the historical 
development of patriarchal forms.<2> Deleuze and Guattari’s near silence on this matter 
must also be seen against the backdrop of the second-wave feminisms that tackled the 
question of patriarchy, running from Simone de Beauvoir’s analysis of the phenomenon of 
male social power in the 1940s to the writings on the concept of patriarchy by figures such as 
Carole Pateman and Rosalind Coward in the early 1980s.<3> In order to understand why 
Deleuze and Guattari’s historical analysis of political structures in Anti-Oedipus has so little 
to say about patriarchy, it will be necessary to go over the political philosophy offered in the 
two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia very closely.  
My arguments in this article are not intended to criticize Deleuze and Guattari’s work for 
failing to cover the topic of patriarchy—after all, it would be impossible for any work to 
cover all political problems.<4> However, by drawing our attention to this particular blind 
spot in Deleuze and Guattari’s work, I hope to point to new ways in which their analysis of 
contemporary power structures could be improved. My contention is that their analysis of 
capitalist power relations could be strengthened by including an analysis of the political 
institution of patriarchy. To do this I will first outline the political philosophy included in 
both Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. I will then show that the concept of “becoming-
woman” holds an anomalous place within Deleuze and Guattari’s Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia project. Finally, I will conclude by providing some suggestions on how we 
might overcome this blind spot by supplementing their work with our own analysis of the 
abstract machine of phallusization. During this process I will argue for the power of their 




THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF ANTI-OEDIPUS 
 
 
Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of political structures in Anti-Oedipus aims to update a 
traditional Marxist account of the historical development of political economy with the 
psychoanalytic conception of desire. Collapsing Marx’s discovery of the abstract concept of 
“labor” into Freud’s discovery of “desire,” Deleuze and Guattari posit “desiring-production” 
as the ground of all political formations (Deleuze and Guattari 2012, 45). Desiring-
production is taken to be the creative force that drives political change and is defined as both 
the “production of reality” (30), and the “production of production” (45). In contrast to 
Marx’s historical account of different modes of production, Deleuze and Guattari define any 
particular form of political or social organization by the specific mode of “anti-production” 
with which it captures or directs the forces of desire (10). For example, Deleuze and Guattari 
write: “The State, its police, and its army form a gigantic enterprise of antiproduction” (256). 
One might think that a political philosophy based on an analysis of the various ways in which 
social structures have constrained and controlled desire would be well placed to offer a 
historical critique of patriarchy, but this possibility is never directly considered in Anti-
Oedipus. 
Deleuze and Guattari’s method is complicated somewhat by their claim that whereas 
political structures such as the state may have a certain level of stability and individuality, the 
forces of desiring-production that give rise to them are pre-individual and dynamic. The pair 
argue that desire is never the desire of a subject, and it does not follow the structural rules of 
serial connection and exclusive disjunction. Instead, desire is “an affirmation that is 
irreducible to any sort of unity” (45). In order to analyze political formations such as the 
state, while at the same time paying attention to the forces of desire that underpin them, 
Deleuze and Guattari suggest that we must be aware of the operation of two simultaneous 
regimes of power. For example, although the nation-state may seem to have rigid borders and 
a well-defined sense of national identity, it is also the case that these borders are constantly 
crossed, continually redrawn, and inconsistently policed. To pick out the different dynamics 
that operate at these two levels, Deleuze and Guattari introduce the terminology of the 
“molar” and the “molecular.”  
This terminology is drawn from the physical sciences, where one “mole” is a figure used 
to consider the effects produced by a large quantity of the same kind of molecule. For 
example, according to molecular physics, my body is made up mainly of empty space, and 
the molecules that compose it are colorless, tasteless, and have no temperature of their own. 
However, taken together as a large aggregate, these molecules produce something supposedly 
solid, colorful, and warm. Just as my body has different qualities when considered from these 
two different perspectives, one and the same political formation will appear different 
depending on whether we consider its regime of desiring-production, or its regime of social 
production (Bonta and Protevi 2004, 114–16). Deleuze and Guattari subsequently argue that 
“molar social production and molecular desiring-production must be evaluated both from the 
viewpoint of their identity in nature and from the viewpoint of their difference in regime” 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2012, 369). I contend that they direct this form of dual analysis at the 
political institutions of capitalism and fascism, but withhold it from their discussions of 
patriarchy.  
One final point must be clarified here before I can show exactly what form an analysis of 
patriarchy would need to take in order to fit into—and complement—the political philosophy 
put forward in Anti-Oedipus. According to Deleuze and Guattari, the molecular regime is 
ahistorical, and history is only an emergent quality of molar formations of desire. In the 
physical sciences, the unidirectional flow of time is guaranteed by the entropic tendency of 
heat to dissipate. However, this phenomenon is based on a statistical tendency of the 
interaction of a large number of molecules.<5> It follows from this that the ordering of time 
is unidirectional only according to a molar regime of organization. Taking up our previous 
 
example of the body, the physical laws that govern the molecules that produce my body are 
time-symmetrical, whereas the laws of thermodynamics that govern the emergent qualities of 
my body, such as its temperature, are time-asymmetrical. Subsequently, even if molecules do 
not deteriorate over time, the molar aggregate of my body does. In Anti-Oedipus, the authors 
attempt to show that political institutions such as the state are molar, statistical effects of 
large aggregates of desire and that under this perspective they are ordered by a “universal 
history” (Deleuze and Guattari 2012, 153–54). However, they also aim to show that the 
unconscious processes that produce these statistical aggregates are not historically ordered. 
This means that a complete account of any political institution must include both a molar, 
historical account of the rise of the institution, as well as a molecular, ahistorical account of 
the form of desiring-production that supports it. According to this assessment, a complete 
Deleuzoguattarian analysis of the institution of patriarchy would need to include both a 
historical analysis of the rise of masculine power and an account of the ahistorical molecular 
production of sexual difference. 
 
 
CAPITALISM AND FASCISM, BUT NO PATRIARCHY 
 
According to the molar history of political organizations that Deleuze and Guattari sketch 
out, the “civilized” mode of antiproduction known as capitalism follows two previous world-
historical modes of political organization, which they call “savage” primitivism and 
“barbarian” despotism (Deleuze and Guattari 2012, 159–68, 210–17).<6> The progression 
from one of these modes of antiproduction to another is not governed by a determinate 
science, and as such, “universal history is the history of contingencies” (154).<7> Unlike 
dialectical accounts of historical progression, the movement from one mode of organization 
to another does not rely on the explication of society’s internal contradictions. Instead, the 
movements from primitivism to despotism, and from despotism to capitalism, are brought 
about when a “line of escape” connects a society to something external. Specifically, the 
breakdown of primitivism occurs only when an imperial despot arrives from over the 
horizon, and despotism collapses only when “the flow of merchant capital” connects one 
despotic regime to another, disrupting the despotic centralization of power (237, 258). When 
this occurs, the previous feudal system of guilds breaks down, bringing about both “the 
decoding of the worker” and “the deterritorialization of wealth” (246). It is the conjunction of 
these two deterritorialized flows that brings about the historical birth of capitalism.<8> 
The molecular account that Deleuze and Guattari offer of each of these modes of 
antiproduction describes the particular organization of desiring-machines on which they rest. 
Here Deleuze and Guattari speak of the different methodologies of “coding” that produce the 
desiring-machines necessary for primitivism, despotism, and capitalism respectively. 
Specifically, they claim that the molecular composition of primitive societies is like a 
“megamachine that codes the flows of production” in order to keep qualitatively different 
social flows distinct from one another (156). According to this account, primitive societies 
make marks on human flesh and on the body of the earth in order to maintain a strict 
separation among different realms of social life. By constantly destroying any surplus 
products through ritual, they also actively ward off the possibility of a centralized power 
taking hold. These molecular processes of coding maintain the primitive territorial regime by 
organizing desire into a particular kind of self-replicating machine. The molecular make-up 
of despotic societies, on the other hand, does not work by coding social flows, but by a 
process of “overcoding practiced by the imperial State” (168). What this means is that, rather 
than destroying the previous social codes, a despotic or imperial society uses these codes to 
make all desire circulate around a single center, namely the body of the despot. Capitalism is 
 
distinguished at the level of the molecular regime not by coding or overcoding, but by “the 
generalized decoding of flows” (168). Instead of using qualitative differences to keep social 
flows distinct from one another, capitalism uses a quantitative axiomatics to bring different 
social flows together, flattening all social interactions into a single market of equivalence. In 
effect, Deleuze and Guattari are giving their own account of the way in which money, as 
abstract capital, dissolves the qualitative differences among different social groups and 
flattens them onto a single market of quantitative value. To summarize, they define 
capitalism according to two different regimes: at the molar level, capitalism is a historical 
deterritorialization of labor and of money brought about by merchant trade, and at the 
molecular level capitalism is defined by the decoding of flows of desire by a quantitative 
axiomatic. Because they see capitalism as the major political form of organization controlling 
contemporary society, they put a lot of effort into analyzing it in great detail: describing its 
molar organization, its molecular organization, and the interaction of these two regimes.  
Fascism, according to Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis, is not another mode of 
antiproduction, along with primitivism, despotism, and capitalism. Instead, it is a particular 
way in which desire comes to desire its own repression (xviii). At a molar level, they offer an 
account of the historical rise of fascism in Europe by showing how particular repressive 
techniques of authoritarian despotism are internalized by the state. However, because Hitler 
and Mussolini came to power in populist movements, Deleuze and Guattari claim that under 
fascism “the masses were not innocent dupes,” and that instead, “at a certain point, under a 
certain set of conditions, they wanted fascism” (31). For this reason, fascism must also be 
accounted for at the level of the molecular organization of desire. Once again, they see 
fascism as the result of the anachronistic force of despotic modes of organization in use in the 
capitalist machine. In the molecular formation of fascist desire, it is the Oedipus complex that 
plays a central role: “Everybody has been Oedipalized and neuroticized at home, at school, at 
work. Everybody wants to be a fascist” (xxiii). Although capitalism is defined at the 
molecular level by a generalized decoding of flows, it must use the overcoding machineries 
of despotism to recapture these flows. The Oedipal family unit is perhaps the most central of 
these machines. Under capitalism, the family unit is used to Oedipalize desire in order to 
create good capitalist subjects. This requires desire to be turned against itself, and if this 
process is not carefully constrained, then desire can become suicidal and can be expressed in 
large molar aggregates of state fascism.  
If Deleuze and Guattari were to give as comprehensive an account of patriarchy as they 
have offered of both capitalism and fascism, then they would need to describe the molar, 
historical rise of patriarchy, the particular molecular organization of patriarchal desire, and 
the convergence of these two regimes in concrete assemblages of power. They are not 
completely silent here; they do speak of our current context as a “patriarchal and capitalist 
society” (191). However, as I will show, although they offer occasional comments on the 
molar regime of patriarchy and the molecular formation of sexual difference, they continually 
subsume these under their discussions of capitalism. Their analysis of the role of the Oedipus 
complex in the molar organization of desire is a good example. For them, the Oedipalization 
of desire is a historical contingency. Against those anthropological accounts that claim that 
incest is an inherent problem that must be guarded against by all societies, Deleuze and 
Guattari argue that the incest taboo arises historically only within despotism and is 
formalized only within the family structure under capitalism (181). This occurs initially when 
the coding of family alliances in primitive societies is disrupted by the overcoding of 
patrilineal filiations in despotism: a system of family alliances produces intermarriage 
through positive incentives, but it is only the despotic imposition of patrilineal filiation that 
treats incest as a negative threat to be avoided.  
 
The Oedipus complex becomes a capitalist formation of desire when the Oedipal family 
takes on the role of the training ground for the production of capitalist subjects. Those who 
desire an unattainable (maternal) object that is kept from their grasp by a resolute (paternal) 
law will make the best capitalist workers, always consuming more and always obeying the 
rules that are imposed on them. Effectively, in a nuclear family setting, children’s 
relationship with their mother teaches them how to relate to commodities, whereas their 
relationship with their father teaches them how to relate to their boss, and to the state. 
Deleuze and Guattari therefore claim that “Oedipus is never a cause: it depends on . . . family 
determinations” (195). This is one of their major revisions of Freud, whom they criticize for 
reversing the order of determination by which the social convention of the nuclear family 
creates Oedipal subjects, instead claiming that the familial romance is a “mere dependence on 
Oedipus” (62). Starting from this error, Freud then “neuroticizes everything in the 
unconscious at the same time as he Oedipalizes, and closes the familial triangle over the 
entire unconscious” 62). For Deleuze and Guattari the order of causation is the other way 
around. Under capitalism, the reproduction of capital in the public setting of the factory 
requires Oedipalized subjects, who are in turn reproduced in the private setting of the family 
triangle.  
This historicization of the Oedipus complex is complemented by Deleuze and Guattari’s 
molecular analysis of the production of sexual difference. Breaking from traditional Freudian 
interpretations of desire, they do not claim that all desire is, at root, sexual desire. On the 
contrary, desiring-production is the impersonal force that drives machinic connections of all 
kinds. According to this analysis, sexuality is an emergent property of molar aggregates that 
is unknown to desiring-production (324). Rather than claiming that desiring-machines are 
ignorant of sex altogether, Deleuze and Guattari state that they maintain a “nonhuman sex” or 
a “microscopic transsexuality” that brings together desiring-machines of all kinds (324–25). 
Whereas certain forms of coding produce a binary distinction between masculine and 
feminine sexuality via the threat of castration, “[t]he molecular unconscious, on the contrary, 
knows nothing of castration” (325). In brief, desire is not necessarily sexual and it is not 
necessarily split by the masculine/feminine binary; however, depending on the way in which 
desiring-production is coded in the unconscious, heterosexual normativity can emerge at the 
level of large aggregates of desire.<9> As Eugene Holland explains, molar representation 
“imposes an exclusive disjunction: the subject must ‘assume’ its sex by choosing either male 
or female for identification” (Holland 1999, 117). Because Deleuze and Guattari’s political 
philosophy necessarily goes by way of a molecular analysis of desire, they write that 
“[s]chizoanalysis is the variable analysis of the n sexes in a subject, beyond the 
anthropomorphic representation that society imposes on this subject. . . . The schizoanalytic 
slogan of the desiring-revolution will be first of all: to each its own sexes” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2012, 325).  
It may seem at this point as if Deleuze and Guattari have given us all of the working parts 
required for an analysis of patriarchy. We have a historical account of the rise of the despot 
who enforces the patrilineal filiation of descent and the beginnings of the Oedipalization of 
desire. We also have a molecular account of how the transsexuality of desiring-production 
becomes coded along a binary sexual axis. However, according to my evaluation, there are at 
least three significant gaps in this analysis. First, according to their molar analysis, they do 
not show why the coding and overcoding of sexual relations has always prioritized the 
masculine position. They explain that primitive societies must ensure that “[f]lows of women 
and children” are coded by strict rules of alliance, but despotic societies overcode this 
relation with a form of filiation that leads all sexual encounters back to the despot as the 
ultimate ruler (156). What they do not question is that the coding of sexual relations in 
primitive societies works by coding the flows of women and not the flows of men. Similarly, 
 
in the case of overcoding, they do not explore why the despot must be male and why the shift 
from alliance to filiation produces a patrilineal line and not a matrilineal one. Second, 
according to their molecular account, Deleuze and Guattari have not explained why the 
binary sexual coding of desiring-production must include an asymmetrical power relation at 
its core. Although it might be the case that molecular transsexuality becomes split by a binary 
form of coding that produces the molar aggregates of both “man” and “woman,” what 
Deleuze and Guattari leave unresolved is the question of why one side of this relation, 
namely the masculine, has been invested with the majority of power? In short, they explain 
the molecular production of the binary itself, but leave to one side the asymmetrical nature of 
this binary formation. Finally, they do not give an account of how the molar history of 
patriarchal norms interacts with the molecular coding of desire. In order for them to carry out 
such an analysis they would need to look at the different ways that transsexual desiring-
production has been coded at the molecular level at different moments in the “universal 
history” of political organization. These projects are left completely unfulfilled in Anti-
Oedipus, and the authors analyze sexual difference and sexual domination only insofar as it 
fits with their world-historical analysis of capitalism.<10> 
 
 
THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF A THOUSAND PLATEAUS 
 
In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari develop a new methodology for discussing the 
differences among particular political regimes. This new technique, which is based on a 
semiotic analysis of different social forms, enables them to clarify a number of things that 
were left incomplete in Anti-Oedipus, including the kind of power wielded by the state and 
the precise difference between totalitarianism and authoritarianism. Deleuze and Guattari also 
use this new technique to provide a more nuanced account of capitalism. Despite the way in 
which they broaden the scope of their political analysis in A Thousand Plateaus, they pay no 
more attention to the question of patriarchy. However, by looking closely at the workings of 
this political analysis, it will be possible to show exactly what is missing from their political 
philosophy regarding the question of patriarchal power, and how we might rectify this 
omission.  
Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy in A Thousand Plateaus relies on the 
identification of what they call “regimes of signs” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 123). In 
effect, they claim that we can identify the power structures in any society by looking at the 
particular ways in which language is used to overcode bodies. Which statements, coming out 
of whose mouths, bring about alterations in the state of affairs? Using the terminology of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s linguistic pragmatism, we can ask: Which “order-words” circulate in 
a semiotic system, and what kinds of “incorporeal transformations” do they bring about 
(119–20)? This analysis is antistructuralist because Deleuze and Guattari argue that the 
efficacy of statements does not rely only on the relations that exist between words, but also 
on the relations between words and bodies. When a priest says, “I now pronounce you 
husband and wife,” or when a judge says, “I find you guilty,” these statements bring about 
alterations in the material state of affairs, not only because of the words themselves, but 
because of the social infrastructure of the church, or of the courts. In these instances, the 
important thing is not what the statements mean, but what role they play in enforcing socially 
accepted forms of desire. Although the efficacy of statements in a given society is always 
changing, Deleuze and Guattari write: “To the extent these variables enter at a given moment 
into determinable relations, the assemblages combine in a regime of signs” (92).  
In place of the molar, historical analysis of primitive, despotic, and capitalist societies that 
was offered in their previous work, in A Thousand Plateaus they identify four different 
 
regimes of signs.<11> These are the presignifying, the signifying, the countersignifying, and 
the postsignifying regimes. We may recognize the signifying regime in situations where 
“every sign refers to another sign, and only to another sign, ad infinitum” (124). The inter-
referential nature of the signifying regime results in a circular system in which all meaning 
revolves around a single center. The signifying regime upholds this circular asymmetry of 
power relations through the use of paranoia. According to Deleuze and Guattari, this is the 
semiotic organization of the despotic state apparatus, in which all signifiers lead back to the 
face of the despot. In contrast to the signifying regime, the presignifying regime is defined as 
the expression of a social stratification that actively wards off the possibility of a despotic and 
signifying regime taking hold. It does this by maintaining multiple forms of expression, 
including “corporeality, gesturality, rhythm, dance, and rite,” which “coexist heterogeneously 
with the vocal form” (130). This pluralism, or polyvocality, is designed to prevent the power 
takeover by a despotic form of signification that would reduce all expression to linguistic 
expression.  
On top of these two regimes of signs, Deleuze and Guattari also discuss countersignifying 
regimes and postsignifying regimes. Countersignifying regimes of signs are defined by their 
use of a mixed semiotic based on “arithmetic and numeration” (131). Deleuze and Guattari 
claim that the countersignifying regime is adopted by nomadic societies, where signs are used 
in the process of creating “smooth space” (424–25). Postsignifying regimes, however, differ 
from the state form not by resisting the stratification of space, but by escaping the circular 
system of reference on a “line of flight” (135). This happens when a “packet of signs 
detaches from the irradiating circular network and sets to work on its own account” (134). 
Deleuze and Guattari’s favorite example here is the escape of the Jewish people from the 
imperial Egyptian system of reference. In this case, a group of people take up a “passional” 
relation with a packet of signs (the Ark of the Covenant) and define their social existence by 
the way they follow this proceeding. It is not possible in this article to go into much depth 
about the detail of how these four regimes operate; however, it is important to point out that 
for Deleuze and Guattari, the distinction between the signifying regime and the 
postsignifying regime—which they also call “the passional regime, or the regime of 
subjectification” (141)—aligns with the difference between totalitarianism and 
authoritarianism. In signifying regimes, statements gain their efficacy through the way that 
they refer back to the despot as the totalizing center of all power. But in subjectifying 
regimes, statements gain their efficacy by the way in which they extend the passional 
proceeding of a single authoritarian aim.  
How does this analysis of regimes of signs relate to the political philosophy of Anti-
Oedipus, and what role does sexual difference play in the articulation of the four regimes? In 
a certain sense, the distinction between the presignifying regime and the signifying regime is 
simply a new way of articulating the difference between the primitive and despotic political 
forms discussed in Anti-Oedipus. However, this does not mean that Deleuze and Guattari 
simply follow the trajectory of Anti-Oedipus and align either the countersignifying or the 
postsignifying regime with capitalism. On the contrary, in A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and 
Guattari claim that capitalism is nothing other than a particular mixture of the signifying 
regime and the subjectifying regime. They write that “the semiotic of capitalism has attained 
this state of mixture in which signifiance and subjectification effectively interpenetrate” 
(202). Adding one further layer of complexity to their account of contemporary power, they 
also pick out the organic stratification of our bodies as a third conditioning force. They speak 
of “the organism, signifiance, and subjectification” as “the three great strata concerning us, in 
other words, the ones that most directly bind us” (176). What is of interest to us here is the 
fact that they also refer to this system as “[o]ur semiotic of modern White Men” (202). But if 
it is the case that the regime of capitalism is inherently dominated by white men, and if 
 
Deleuze and Guattari are aware of this, then how do they account for this fact? In short, what 
is the relationship between patriarchy and capitalism in A Thousand Plateaus?<12> 
Deleuze and Guattari do not leave us completely empty-handed here as they offer some 
insights into the masculinity of the signifying and subjectifying regimes. For example, the 
face of the despot, around which all signification circulates in the signifying regime of signs, 
is assumed to be a male face. This is implicit in Deleuze and Guattari’s description of the 
despotic regime of signification. Consider, for example, the implicit gendering of the subject 
who undergoes signifiance in this passage: “Your wife looked at you with a funny 
expression. And this morning the mailman handed you a letter from the IRS and crossed his 
fingers. Then you stepped in a pile of dog shit. You saw two sticks on the sidewalk 
positioned like the hands of a watch. They were whispering behind your back when you 
arrived at the office. It doesn't matter what it means, it's still signifying” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2004, 124). Part of the explanation for the implied masculinity of the signifier may 
reside in the fact that “[w]ith the despot, everything is public” (128). The circulation of 
signifiers takes place in the public space of the city, and not in the private realm of the family 
home. The result of this is that in a signifying regime of signs it is the statements of men, 
issuing from the mouths of men, that have the power to bring about “incorporeal 
transformations” in the material regime of bodies. Similar assumptions about the masculinity 
of the subject are made in Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of the postsignifying regime. For 
example, they code the passion of the subjectifying escape as a resolutely masculine passion 
in which someone flees from despotism “in the mad hope of founding, with a woman of their 
family, a race that would finally be pure and represent a new beginning” (139). Once again, 
in this context, it is those statements of male desire that have efficacy in the regime of signs.  
What is telling is that Deleuze and Guattari speak of this power in masculine terms, but 
they do not give any explanation of why the despot is taken to be male, and why the passion 
that escapes the despot is understood as masculine. Their analysis of the gendered nature of 
linguistics is typical of the way in which they take note of sexual difference, without offering 
an account of its genesis. They write: “Let us suppose that the constant or standard is the 
average adult-white-heterosexual-European-male-speaking a standard language” (116). They 
“suppose” this because “[i]t is obvious that ‘man’ holds the majority, even if he is less 
numerous than mosquitoes, children, women, blacks, peasants, homosexuals, etc.” (116). 
However, on reading these passages, we are left without any account of the historical 
conditions that made the majoritarian position of man so “obvious” to us today. Once again, 
Deleuze and Guattari imply the existence of contemporary patriarchy, but refuse to include 
an account of it in their historical analysis of the rise of capitalist power relations. If we are to 
correct this oversight, we must turn to the vexed question of the role of the concept of the 
becoming-woman within Capitalism and Schizophrenia.  
 
 
ABSTRACT MACHINES, FACIALIZATION, AND THE ANOMALOUS BECOMING-WOMAN 
 
As well as giving a description of the different regimes of signs, and the other stratifications 
that bind us, the political philosophy of A Thousand Plateaus attempts to describe how it is 
possible to escape each of them in turn. These escapes are given in the form of different 
“becomings.” In what remains of this article, I will aim to show that in the long list of 
different “becomings” that Deleuze and Guattari discuss, their conception of “becoming-
woman” holds an anomalous place. Specifically, “becoming-imperceptible,” “becoming-
indiscernible,” “becoming-impersonal,” and “becoming-animal” can each be correlated with 
a specific regime of power that it is necessary to escape, but Deleuze and Guattari put 
forward the supposed importance of “becoming-woman” without explaining what it enables 
 
us to escape from. This is particularly bizarre given their claim that “[a]lthough all becomings 
are already molecular, including becoming-woman, it must be said that all becomings begin 
with and pass through becoming-woman. It is the key to all other becomings” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2004, 306). If it is the case that becoming-woman plays a privileged role in the 
revolutionary process of becoming-minoritarian, then surely there should be a regime of 
masculinization—or, as we will see, an abstract machine of masculinization—from which 
becoming-woman will enables us to escape.<13> 
As a mode of revolutionary politics, the processes of becoming that Deleuze and Guattari 
outline are like methodologies for undoing the sedimentation of particular regimes of power. 
The concept of “becoming” attempts to grasp the kind of movement that occurs in processes 
of transformation without subordinating those transformations to the particular beings that 
they produce.<14> “Becoming-woman” is not the process of changing from a man into a 
woman. On the contrary, Deleuze and Guattari claim that it is “not imitating or assuming the 
female form, but emitting particles that enter the relation of movement and rest, or the zone 
of proximity, of a microfemininity” (304). This means that such a process is not the 
“prerogative of the man” and that “the woman as a molar entity has to become-woman” 
(304). In brief, if the majoritarian ideal of “man” is taken as a norm against which all men 
and all women are compared, then both men and women need to find ways of escaping this 
norm. As Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin state, becoming-woman is “an act upon the 
fundamental phallogocentric organizational politics of society, claiming that every 
emancipation (also of men) has to take up a femininity as a necessary means to undo 
patriarchy” (Dolphijn and van der Tuin 2013, 132). It is not my intention here to go over the 
many debates concerning the potential power of what Claire Colebrook calls “that tortured 
concept of “becoming-woman’” (Colebrook and Weinstein 2008, 1). Instead, what I hope to 
show is that this concept holds an anomalous position within Deleuze and Guattari’s work, 
and that to grasp its significance we must find a way of closing the patriarchy-shaped-hole in 
their analysis of power.  
To show how the concept of “becoming-woman” holds such an anomalous position, we 
must take note of the way it differs in its relation to the other “becomings” suggested by 
Deleuze and Guattari. First, given that becomings are designed as modes of escape from 
stratification, we should not be surprised to find that they explicitly list three kinds of 
becoming that relate to “the three great strata” of “the organism, signifiance, and 
subjectification” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 176). These three becomings are “the 
(anorganic) imperceptible, the (asignifying) indiscernible, and the (asubjective) impersonal” 
(308). However, what is most interesting for us here is the fact that they do not think it is 
possible to carry out becoming-imperceptible, becoming-indiscernible, or becoming-
impersonal directly. This is because the three great stratifications that they combat do not 
work separately. If capitalism is the interpenetration of the signifying and the postsignifying 
regime of signs, then what we must escape first is the particular abstract machine that enables 
these two regimes to interpenetrate. For Deleuze and Guattari, an abstract machine is what 
connects “forms of expression or regimes of signs (semiotic systems) and forms of content or 
regimes of bodies (physical systems)” (155). Regimes of signs can give us some insight into 
the power relations in a particular society, but the important point is how a regime of signs 
interacts with the regime of bodies that make up such a society. As in our previous example, 
the priest’s words in the marriage ceremony gain their significance and their power through 
the ability they have to alter the material arrangement of bodies.  
According to their analysis in A Thousand Plateaus, it is the abstract machine of 
“faciality” that connects the regime of signification and that of subjectification with the 
physical systems that they overcode. It is the human face that acts as the site of both 
signification and subjectification, and it is the different capacities of the face that put these 
 
two regimes into their state of mutual presupposition. Specifically, the face of the despot, 
seen from the front, acts as the “white wall” onto which all signification is inscribed, and the 
act of subjectification is always accompanied by a turning away of the face toward a “black 
hole” (186). Concrete examples of faces are said to be “engendered by an abstract machine 
of faciality,” which also “gives the signifier its white wall and subjectivity its black hole” 
(187). The human face is capable of being taken up by this abstract machine of faciality 
because humans evolved to stand on two feet, thus freeing their hands for grasping, in turn 
freeing their mouths to be used for speech (68). In effect, the abstract machine of faciality 
thus accounts for the combination of the three great strata: it is a particular organization of 
the body, namely the deterritorialization of the head to create a face, that allows for the 
interpenetration of signification and subjectification. Because this abstract machine is a 
necessary part of the interpenetration of the three great strata, we must find a way of escaping 
the abstract machine of faciality before we can begin the processes of “becoming” aimed at 
any of these three strata individually. The particular mode of becoming that Deleuze and 
Guattari wield against the abstract machine of faciality is the becoming-animal. They speak 
of the “one who loses his or her face” as “entering into a becoming-animal” (128). Animals, 
especially those of the pack with whom Deleuze and Guattari are so enamored, are said to 
have heads, but no faces. By becoming-animal it is possible to denature our faces and to turn 
our heads into what they call “probe-heads” (211).  
For Deleuze and Guattari, many different abstract machines allow for the different ways in 
which the regimes of signs can mix with one another. It is for this reason that an “apparent 
progression can be established for the segments of becoming in which we find ourselves; 
becoming-woman, becoming-child; becoming-animal, -vegetable, or -mineral; becomings-
molecular of all kinds, becomings-particles” (300). If each of these becomings correlates with 
an abstract machine, and if “all the molecular becomings . . . begin with becoming-woman,” 
then there must be an abstract machine more general, or more central, than the abstract 
machine of faciality (308). This abstract machine would need to account for the particular 
mixture of regimes of signs that produces the patriarchal norm of the white man. Although 
Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of faciality recognizes that the abstract face “is White Man 
himself, with his broad white cheeks and the black hole of his eyes,” this abstract machine 
would need to explain why it is the case that this norm of masculine faciality is produced 
(196). That is to say, it would need to explain the role that patriarchy plays in the production 
of the capitalist power relations of contemporary life. It is an account of just such an abstract 
machine that is missing from A Thousand Plateaus, and it is here that we can locate their 
absent analysis of patriarchy.  
It is worth emphasizing here the way in which my approach differs from those of a 
number of other scholars who have discussed the difficulties presented by the concept of 
becoming-woman. In her insightful analysis, Rosi Braidotti also claims that “there is an 
unresolved knot in Deleuze’s relation to the becoming-woman” (Braidotti 2003, 47). 
However, whereas Braidotti aims to uncover a tension within the concept of becoming-
woman—one that oscillates around the “double pull” of empowering women while 
dissolving the concept of woman—I aim to explore a wider problem in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s work, to which the concept of becoming-woman points. The problem is this: if the 
process of becoming-woman is privileged in relation to the other becomings, then we should 
expect there to be an accompanying account of the specified social stratification from which 
such a becoming would escape. If we find this lacking in Deleuze and Guattari’s account, 
then we are in a position to strengthen their overall analysis by supplementing it with a new 




THE PRESIGNIFYING REGIME OF BODIES AND THE ABSTRACT MACHINE OF PHALLUSIZATION 
 
Perhaps the most surprising thing about Deleuze and Guattari’s identification of organization, 
signification, and subjectification as the strata “that most directly bind us” is that it comes 
with no accompanying justification (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 176). We are simply told 
that these three strata are the most restrictive without an explanation of why, say, the 
stratifications brought about by the other regimes of signs are of less consequence. This is 
important because what they overlook is the possibility that the “primitive” stratifications of 
the presignifying regime of signs might still be operative in contemporary society. It is by 
refusing to take account of this fact that they fail to acknowledge the extent to which 
patriarchy governs contemporary life.<15> In this final section, I aim to show that an analysis 
of the presignifying regime is necessary to see how patriarchy has become one of the “great 
strata” of modern capitalism.  
For Deleuze and Guattari, the presignifying regime of signs designates a particular 
semiotic form of coding, prevalent in primitive societies. This semiotics is essentially 
polyvocal, so that a number of different chains of meaning operate simultaneously, without 
overlapping. They call it “a segmentary but plurilinear, multidimensional semiotic that wards 
off any kind of signifying circularity” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 130). In effect, the 
presignifying regime is simply the semiotics of the primitive societies that they described in 
Anti-Oedipus. Here, all social flows are coded according to qualitative differences and are 
subsequently kept apart from one another. Specifically, Deleuze and Guattari write that 
“[f]lows of women and children, flows of herds and of seed, sperm flows, flows of shit, 
menstrual flows: nothing must escape coding” (156). Men and women must be coded 
separately in the presignifying regime because the mode of social reproduction operative here 
relies on the transfer of women among family alliances. They speak of a system of alliances 
in which “mobile debts” circulate among families, including “women, consumer goods, ritual 
objects, rights, prestige, status” (164). In brief, a society of tribal alliances that operates with 
multiple simultaneous semiotic registers relies on the coding of male and female bodies, and 
the circulation of the female bodies among the male.  
But how do male and female bodies become coded in the presignifying regime? It cannot 
be via signification or subjectification, which arise only with signifying and postsignifying 
regimes respectively. Neither can the division of male and female bodies rely on the abstract 
machine of the face. As Deleuze and Guattari point out: “Certain assemblages of power 
(pouvoir) require the production of a face, others do not. If we consider primitive societies, 
we see that there is very little that operates through the face” (195). Instead, in primitive 
societies, the coding of different social flows “operates through bodies” (195). What 
separates male and female bodies in the primitive regime is therefore a system of bodily 
distinctions that does not rely on the face, or on signifying language. What I want to suggest 
here is that instead of an abstract machine of faciality, presignifying distinctions between 
men and women come about via an abstract machine of phallusization. Just as the abstract 
machine of faciality transforms the head into a face via an incorporeal transformation that 
allows for the birth of signification, it is the transformation of the penis into a phallus that 
allows for the birth of the presignifying system of social reproduction. Just as the human head 
is freed from its previous functions to become a face, with humans standing on two feet, the 
penis becomes a visible marker that can be taken up in the coding of gender. When the penis 
in no longer taken as simply a physical organ, but as a marker of gender difference, it 
becomes the phallus. The birth of presignifying regimes is also the event in which the phallus 
becomes a sign.<16> The phallus is a mark on the exterior surface of the body used to 
separate the flows of men and women in primitive societies.<17> 
 
It is important to explicitly speak about this abstract machine of phallusization, which 
transforms the penis into the phallus, because an analysis of this machine can help us to see 
how the presignifying regime interpenetrates with the signifying and the postsignifying 
regimes in capitalism and how they mutually create our contemporary patriarchal modes of 
life. In his introduction to Anti-Oedipus, Holland notes that Deleuze and Guattari’s work 
suggests that “gender was fundamental to social identity under savagery and despotism” and 
that, in comparison to capitalist modes of oppression, “further schizoanalysis of the 
patriarchies of savagery and despotism would show that they operate very differently” 
(Holland 1999, 116 and 146). This article has begun such a schizoanalysis by arguing that the 
use of the phallus to qualitatively code bodies as male and female is a necessary precondition 
for both the signifying and the postsignifying regimes. As we have already seen, despotic or 
totalitarian societies utilize a signifying regime of signs to overcode the previous codings of 
the primitive societies they capture. A single signifying chain is used to overcode the others, 
collapsing the previous polyvocality and creating a circular irradiating network of 
signification with a single, “master signifier” at the center (Deleuze and Guattari 2012, 225). 
It is the phallus, first created in the presignifying regime, that takes on this role. It is for this 
reason that the despot can be assumed to be male. Similarly, the masculinity of the passional 
subject of the postsignifying regime, who follows “the mad hope” of escaping “with a woman 
of their family,” is guaranteed by the coding of bodies carried out by the abstract machine of 
phallusization (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 139). It is the transformation of the penis into the 
sign of the phallus that allows for both the original qualitative distinction between men and 
women and the interpenetration of the presignifying, signifying, and postsignifying regimes 
in contemporary patriarchy.<18>  
With the central role of the abstract machine of phallusization in mind, we are now in a 
position to understand why it might be the case that the process of becoming-woman is 
primary in relation to the becoming-animal. Becoming-animal is a technique for combating 
the facialization of the head that can be used to undo the interpenetration of the three 
stratifications of organization, signification, and subjectification, but it is only the becoming-
woman that can resist the phallusization of the penis and subsequently disrupt the mutual 
upholding of the presignifying regime with the other three great stratifications.  
 
 
TOWARD A SCHIZOANALYSIS OF PATRIARCHY 
 
By sketching out the political philosophy offered in both Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand 
Plateaus, in this article I have tried to show that Deleuze and Guattari do not offer an 
adequate account of patriarchy. They do not identify it directly as one of the major structures 
constraining contemporary life and, crucially, whenever they do discuss the gendered nature 
of power they simply take the dominance of masculinity for granted, without offering a 
genetic account of this domination. They argue that binary sexual difference is only an effect 
of molar aggregations of desire, and that at a molecular level there is nothing other than a 
“microscopic transsexuality” (Deleuze and Guattari 2012, 324–25). At no point, however, do 
they explain why the particular binary that is produced between male and female sexuality is 
an asymmetrical one that repeatedly prioritizes male desire. They also speak of the way in 
which sexual difference in the family setting is mobilized by capitalism to produce docile, 
Oedipal subjects of consumption, and the way in which totalitarian and authoritarian regimes 
rely on masculine forms of desire. However, they never offer an account of how the gendered 
division of sexual desire comes about, or why it is so embedded in the operations of 
signification and subjectification. All of this makes their claim that becoming-woman is “the 
key to all other becomings” very confusing indeed (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 306). 
 
Following this, and by showing the anomalous position held by the concept of becoming-
woman in the Capitalism and Schizophrenia series, I have attempted to show how it would 
be possible to supplement Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of contemporary power relations 
with an account of the abstract machine of phallusization. My aim here was to show how an 
account of the genesis of sexual difference in presignifying societies could strengthen 
Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy. This project is important for feminist scholars of 
Deleuze and Guattari because it shows not only that the gendered nature of political power 
plays a role in the development of contemporary capitalism, but that it is a prerequisite for the 
“three great strata” of organization, signification, and subjection that typify the capitalist 
mode of antiproduction (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 176). Though my initial account of 
phallusization was brief, a full analysis of this abstract machine could allow for a 
Deleuzoguattarian reading of politics that is able to explain the centrality of patriarchal power 
in contemporary life and also explain why the becoming-woman—as a technique capable of 





1. There is no space in this article for a full overview of the many feminist encounters with 
Deleuze and Guattari’s work. For a concise and lucid overview of the major themes, see 
Colebrook and Buchanan 2000. For a more up-to-date overview, see Stark 2017. 
2. Marx, for example, writes: “If supremacy and subordination come to take the place of 
slavery, serfdom, vassalage and other patriarchal forms of subjection, the change is purely 
one of form” (Marx 1982, 1027–28). Freud also claims that “[w]ith the introduction of father-
deities a fatherless society gradually changed into one organized on a patriarchal basis,” so 
that it was the “divine kings” who “introduced the patriarchal system into the state” (Freud 
1981, 149–50). 
3. See Beauvoir’s claim that “the triumph of patriarchy was neither an accident nor the 
result of a violent revolution” (Beauvoir 2009, 88). It is likely that Deleuze and Guattari 
would have been familiar with Beauvoir’s work, and Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin 
even suggest that the concept of becoming-woman might have been borrowed from Beauvoir 
(Dolphijn and van der Tuin 2013, 132). Carole Pateman sees the concept of patriarchy as 
vital because it is “the only concept that refers specifically to the subjection of women, that 
singles out the form of political right that all men exercise by virtue of being men” (Pateman 
1988, 20), and Rosalind Coward sees it as the term that “has been most widely used as the 
foundations for a specifically feminist investigation of sexual relations” (Coward 1983, 7). 
4. Despite this, I have decided to concentrate specifically on the Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia series in this article for two reasons. First, because it is in these two books that 
Deleuze and Guattari most clearly set out their own political philosophy. This point is clearly 
argued by Guillaume Sibertin-Blanc (Sibertin-Blanc 2016, 9–17). Second, Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia marks a new direction for both Deleuze and Guattari in which they move away 
from many of their previous positions concerning the structural nature of power relations 
(Thornton 2017). 
5. For a simple overview of this interpretation of molecular physics, see Rovelli 2014, 60. 
For a more in-depth look at the role of statistical probabilities in determining the 
directionality of time, see Halliwell, Pérez-Mercader, and Zurek 1994, 108–15. 
6. Because they consider universal history to be an emergent quality of molar aggregates, 
the “history” that they put forward is intended to be ironic. It is an account of the way in 
which history is fantasized from the perspective of capital: “In a word, universal history is 
 
not only retrospective, it is also contingent, singular, ironic, and critical” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2012, 154). 
7. For a comprehensive account of this form of historical contingency, see Lundy 2013. 
8. Deleuze and Guattari agree with Marx’s claim in Capital regarding the role of merchant 
capital in the downfall of the feudal system (Marx 1982, 895), but they attempt to rescue 
Marx from Hegelianism by refusing to read this transformation as an internal sublation of the 
contradictions of feudalism, and instead highlight the creative act of deterritorialization 
required for merchant capital to circulate. For more on the traditional Marxist account of the 
birth of capitalism, see Birnbaum 1953, 135–37. 
9. Given Deleuze and Guattari’s materialist conception of desire, their comments here do 
not easily map onto the sex/gender distinction. As the individual subject is also a molar 
aggregate for them, the closest thing we can say is that material desire makes no distinction 
between either sex or gender, but that the expression of this desire in molar aggregates of 
sexuality determine both sex and gender at different levels. 
10. In a certain way, Deleuze and Guattari can be seen as falling foul of the charge made 
by Coward that although the concept of patriarchy offers itself as “an account of the history 
of sexual relations . . . at a certain point the same question has to be asked: why was it men 
who took control and what were the interests thus served?” (Coward 1983, 8). 
11. Deleuze and Guattari do not drop the distinction between the molar and the molecular 
in this text, but they do not use it in the same way. This is due to the fact that the three 
different forms of articulation of content and expression that they discuss in A Thousand 
Plateaus, namely the physical, the organic, and the alloplastic, split the molecular and the 
molar regimes in different ways (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 46). 
12. As these quotations indicate, Deleuze and Guattari take note of the racialized nature of 
desire under capitalism. This is also evident in their analysis of subjectifying, authoritarian 
desire, which I mention below (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 139). However, they pay little 
attention to the specifics of this history. Although I do not have the space to do so here, I 
would argue that their political philosophy could also be strengthened through a close 
analysis of the historical production of racial power. As Nick Fox and Pam Alldred argue, to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of molar forms we must “add patriarchy, heteronormativity, 
racism, biomedicine and other systems of thought that territorialize bodies” (Fox and Alldred 
2013, 782). Michelle Koerner has begun this work by situating Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concept of the line of flight in black radical thought, via an analysis of the writing of George 
Jackson (Koerner 2011, 157–80); Simone Bignall has explored the political possibilities of 
dismantling the “White-Man Face” (Bignall 2013, 73); and, more recently, Colebrook has 
been developing a Deleuzoguattarian account of racial power that explicitly deals with its 
qualitative difference from, and interactions with, patriarchy (unpublished). 
13. In her essay “Woman in Limbo: Deleuze and His Br(others),” Alice Jardine notes that 
each mode of becoming enables us to escape from a particular stratification and that the 
becoming-woman holds a primary position in relation to the other modes of becoming 
(Jardine 1984, 52). She does not, however, connect the dots and suggest that Deleuze and 
Guattari’s analysis of contemporary power relations fails to give an account of the specific 
stratification from which the becoming-woman would enable us to escape. 
14. Becoming is one of the central concepts that connects Deleuze’s earlier work to his 
work with Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus. See Deleuze’s essay “Control and Becoming” 
(in Deleuze 1995, 169–74). 
15. In a certain sense, we could see Deleuze and Guattari as guilty of Pateman’s charge 
against those theorists who claim that “modern society can be pictured as post-patriarchal and 
patriarchy seen as a pre-modern and/or familial social form” (Pateman 1988, 21).  
 
16. There have been a number of feminist critiques of the concept of the phallus in 
psychoanalytic theory. Luce Irigiray has argued, for example, that in Freudian theory, the 
phallus is the “[e]mblem of man's appropriative relation to the origin” which ultimately 
confirms his access to social control (Irigiray 1985, 42). In light of these claims, I must 
clarify that my analysis of the abstract machine of phallusization does not return the phallus 
to its position as the originary cause of sexual difference. On the contrary, my analysis takes 
the de facto power of the phallus as requiring an explanation, while simultaneously critiquing 
any de jure claims of the phallus as the center of all meaning. It is an attempt to explain the 
genesis of phallogocentrism without taking phallogocentrism as natural or necessary. 
17. It may be possible to interpret this move within Thomas Laqueur’s account of the shift 
from the one-sex to the two-sex theory of human anatomy, especially regarding Laqueur’s 
claim that the former mode of social organization aimed to control the flow of “fungible” 
bodily fluids (Laqueur 2003, 19). The move to a two-sex model would then be explained in 
Deleuzoguattarian terms by the way in which the binary logic of despotic societies captured 
this qualitative difference and used it to overcode other social functions. However, Deleuze 
and Guattari’s methodology is distinct from that of Laqueur as the narrative that they put 
forward in their anthropology is intended to be both ironic and critical, rather than strictly 
historical, in the traditional sense of the term. 
18. There is a connection here between my analysis of a Deleuzoguattarian reading of 
patriarchy and that of Zillah Eisenstein. Eisenstein recognizes two ways in which the term 
patriarchy is used: “(1) a legalistic concept involving the historical period of father-right 
from antiquity to the demise of feudalism and (2) as an all-encompassing view of human 
culture that spans recorded history to the present” (Eisenstein 1986, 18). Eisenstein critiques 
both of these views in favor of a reading in which patriarchy is “a dynamically changing 
political system” that operates “alongside the economic mode of society” and that “alters 
itself in order to preserve itself” (20). Deleuze and Guattari’s ahistorical analysis of the 
molecular regime of desire can thus be thought of as a radicalization of Eiseinstein’s position, 
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